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Summary
The paper deals with two areas of interest in connection with the safe-
guarding of a centrifuge plant, namely, a) a critical analysis of a few
characteristics of centrifuge plants which are relevant to safeguards and
b) a record-report system for such aplant.
Some characteristics of a centrifuge plant are conducive to safeguards.
The gas phase inventory in the separating part of the cascade is very low.
The feed, product and tail streams are all pure UF6 and are among the most
accurately measurable process streams in a nuclear cycle (this is true for
all enrichment facilities). These factors permit a simplified balancing
system for safeguards. It is not possible to establish the separative work
of a centrifuge plant directly during normal operation. However, it is not
necessary to have an independent knowledge on separative work for safeguards
purposes.
Only two material balance areas are required for a record-report system in
iill~ refer~nce celliiriflJg~ plant witll tll~ ca.pa.city of 600 tU SW/yr. The EDP
system can be built up in such a way that it can be used for the records
and reports for safeguards and for the plant requirement. The same struc-
ture can be used for a much simplified record-report system in a smaller
size plant.
Zusammenfassung
Im vorliegenden Bericht werden zwei Interessenbereiche für die Überwachung
einer Zentrifugenanlage gestreift, nämlich a) eine kritische Analyse einiger
überwachungsrelevanter Eigenschaften der Zentrifugenanlage und b) ein Proto-
koll- und Berichterstattungssystem für eine solche Anlage.
Einige Eigenschaften einer Zentrifugenanlage sind überwachungsfreundlich.
Das Gasinventar der Trennkaskade einer solchen Anlage ist sehr niedrig.
Die Eingangs-, Produkt- und abgereicherten Ströme aus der Kaskade sind
reines UF6 und gehören zu den sehr genau meßbaren Verfahrensströmen im
Brennstoffzyklus. (Dies gilt jedoch für alle Anreicherungsanlagen.) Sie
gestatten die Erstellung eines einfachen Bilanzierungssystems zum Zwecke
der Überwachung. Es ist nicht möglich, die Trennleistung einer Zentrifugen-
anlage während des Betriebs direkt zu erfassen. Für die Überwachung ist je-
doch eine unabhängige Kenntnis der Trennleistung nicht erforderlich.
Zwei Mengenbilanzzonen sind für das Protokoll- und Berichterstattungssystem
für die Referenzanlage mit 600 tU TAle. ausreichend. Das EDV System karaI so
aufgebaut werden, daß es sowohl für die Überwachungsprotokolle und Berichte
wie auch für den Betrieb verwendet werden kann. Das gleiche Protokoll- und
Berichtsystem kann in wesentlich vereinfachter Form für kleine Anlagen
eingesetzt werden.
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1. Introduction
With light water type reactors dominating increasingly the commercial field
of nuclear energy production, uranium enrichment facilities become more and
more an integral part of a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. Up till now low en-
riched uranium for energy production has come almost exclusively from the
diffusion plants of the United States. However, in recent years strong
commercial interest has become evident in the centrifuge method of uranium
enrichment /1, 2/. Systems analytical studies carried out in the recBat past
on required safeguards measures for enrichment facilities with centrifuges
tend to indicate that the basic technical procedures laid down in the lAEA
Paper presented at the IAEA Working Group Meeting on Safeguards
procedures for Isotopic Enrichment ,Facilities. 12-16.6.72 in Vienna
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document INFCIRC/153 /3/ are adequate for applying international safeguards
in such facilities. In this case also material accountancy forms the basic
safeguards measure vith containment and surveillance as important complemen-
tary measures. In the present paper some safeguards relevant characteristics
of a centrifuge plant for the enrichment of uranium have been critically
examined. Furthermore the structure of a recording system for the establish-
ment and execution of safeguards material accountancy measures has been dis-
cussed on the basis of a 600 t SWU/yr reference plant.
2. Safeguards relevant characteristics of a centrifuge facility
2. 1 Separative work
Uranium enrichment facilities are in general unique in the sense that in the
open part of the fuel cycle (conversion, rabrication, reprocessing, enrich-
ment) only this type causes an increase in the effective kg output. This
fact has several safeguards relevant implications. With the installed separa-
tive work capability of an enrichment facility, it is theoretically possible
to produce higher U-235 enrichment than the design value. However, commercial
and technological conditions require that relatively small cascade sizes (500-
600 t S\OlU/yr) may be operated in parallel on a modular basis in luge plants.
Any significant ~ount of high enriched material from such small cascades can
be expected to be detected relatively easily by establishing proper material
balances and safeguards procedures.
Because of technical and economical limitations it is not possible to obtain
sufficiently accurate direct and independent information on the actual sepa-
rative work performed by a centrifuge cascade. Some of the limitations are
enumerated below /6/.
It is neceasary to have information on the following points in order to
assess the separative work produced in a centrifuge cascade at a given time
in an independent manner:
1. Sum of the centrifuges in operation.
2. The separative work produced by individual centrifuges.
3. Mixing losses in the cascade.
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2.1.1 Number of centrifuges in operation
It is necessary to have an indication and registration of the operation
of each of the centrifuges in a cascade so that the actual number of
centrifUges operating at a given time can Ce known. This is necessary
to calculate the total separative work produced in a cascade. Because
of the very/high number of centrifuges even in a cascade of relatively
small capability and high economic penalty associated with instrumentation
of individual centrifuges for indication of its operation, no industrially
operating centrifuge plant is expected to have such instrumentation. It is
therefore, highly probable that the plant operators themselves would not
know the exact number of centriruges operating at a given time in a cascade.
2.1.2 Separative work produced in a centrifuge
Even if the relevant characteristics of a centrifuge were known to the inspection
authority (which are clasified at present) it would virtually be impossible
for such an authority to deduce the separative work produced by a particular
centrifuge in operation at a given time. Manufacturing tolerances can shift
the separative work output of a given lot of centrifuges from the expected
value on a operation curve in a systematic manner. The &ging of a centrifuge
on account of (among others) deposition of impurities, residues of chemical
reactions etc. on various parts cf a centrifuge, may cause different rates of
reduction of separative work production for different centrifuges as a function
of time. A reduction in the separati ve work produced in a centrifuge may
also be caused by different types of leakages (e.g. welding leakage, leakage
because of ciefective seals etc.) as shown in Fig. 1 or slight changes in the
withdrawal system.
2.1.3 Mixing losses in a cascade
The mixing losses in a cascade depends among others,on the type of cascade
connections, enrichment obtained and the extent of shifting of the operating
point of individual centrifuges caused by some of the factors mentioned under
2.1.2. Since some of the causes for these losses m~ also cause a change in
the stage cut, they may result in a further shift of the operating point
of a centrifuge from the optimum. The extent of reduction in the separative
work production of a whole cascade depends also on the location at which
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centrifuge failures take place. This is shown in Fig. 2.
The overall effect of all these factors is always a reduction in the separative
work production of a cascade from the design value. Since the plant operators
themselves will not be in a position to know in a quantitative manner the magni-
tude of these influences, their only meanS of knowing the separation work
produced in a cascade is the calculation on the basis of the production rates
and concentrations of the product and the tail streams - that is by establish-
ing material and isotopic balances. Besides, the centrifuge plants differ in
one respect from the gas diffusion plants. There is no single characteristic
(in diffusion plants, the energy eonsumption) which can indieate direetly
the separation work produced in a eascade with any reasonable aceuraey.
2.2 Classifieation of information
At present some information on eentrifuge teehnology is classified. This
classification will pose some limitations on the safeguards organisations
with regard to the access of some technical information and locations such
as the separation area of the easeades and the maintenance area ror centrifuges.
Detailed analyses of safeguards problems /4/ indieate that such limitations
need not hamper the proper and effective functioning of an international safe-
guards system.
2.3 Conditions for material aceountaney measures
The feed, product and tail streams in an enrichment facility are pure UF6 and
are among the most accurately measurable proeess streams in a nuclear fuel cyele.
They are normally measured in discrete batches eonsisting of cylinders eontain-
ing UF6. Besides, in a commercial centrifuge plant, the gas phase inventory in
the separating part of the caseade is expeeted to be exceedingly low. With proper
plant layout and storage arrangements, the inventor)" taking in a faeili ty can
be simplified. Beeause of these reasons, a centrifuge plant is ideally suited
for the execution of material accountancy measures. However, such a facility
may also have some other MUF problems which are discussed below.
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2.4 Problems of MUF
An analysis of various components of the MUF in SDme of the facilities
belonging to the open part of the fuel cycle indicated /7/ that they may
have their origin both in measurement and in process components. rtis to
be expected that in a centrifuge plant this will not be different. Since
the accuracy of measurement for the three main process streams are expected
to be high, some important contribution to the variance of MUF may come from
the measurement errors associated with the various waste streams {not the
tails} leaving the plant. Also, besides the gas phase inventory inside the
cascade which can be considered' to be small, some solid phase deposition
of uranium in various parts of the separating and non-separating parts of
the cascade may be expected. Since such deposits cannot be balanced directly,
they may be considered as a hidden inventory and will contribute to the ex-
pectation value of the MliF. Another te~PQrary contribution to such a hidden
inventory may be from the amounts accumulating in the traps of the vacuum
system so long they are not discharged into the decontamination or waste
systems. Results obtained sofar indicate that these values will be small
and may remain in the range of the measurement uncertainties. However,
careful analysis of these components on the basis of historical performance
of a facility is necessary to keep a safeguards system based mainly .on material
accountancy effective.
2.5 Problems of maintenance
A centrifuge plant m~ require regular maintenance and replacement activities
for eentrifuges throughout the year. This will necessitate availability of
maintenance and test areas near the operating cascades. Such areas will also
not be accessible to inspection personnel.
3. Reference plant
A reference centrifuge plant with a separative work capability of 600 t U/yr.
has been considered to analyse the basic requirements of arecord system.
The important data for the plant are presented in Table 1. The schematic
layout of the plant is shown in Fig. 3. The product concentration has been
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chosen to be 3 %U-235 i.e. the average concentration for LWR type
fuels. The tails are assumed to contain 0.3 %U-235·The area lined around
the cascade containing the separating units and maintenance and test area
is assumed to be inaccessible for inspection. It is to be noted that all
intermediate storage vessels, sUblimators, traps, vaccuum system, effluent
I
treatment systems etc., i.e. those parts which m~ contain large amounts
of intermediate inventory of uranium, are accessible to inspection.
3.1 Material Balance Areas
The reference plant has been assumed to be devided into two MBAs for safeguards
purposes, as indicated in Fig. 4, i. e. one storage and one process MBA. The
actual numbers of MBAs depend among others, on the specific characteristics
of the plant, the possibility of measurement of transfers from one MBA to the
other and the accuracy 6r measurements. For large plants consisting of a
number of parallelly connected modules, i t might be advantageous to have
multiple number of MBAs provided of course, independent input end output systems
exist for each of the modules.
Two MBAs per module offer a number of operational and safeguards advantages.
The personnel responsibilities for material in tbe plant are divided in the
aame w~ namely tone group being responsible ror the storage part and the
other for the process part. For safeguards it requires low reporting activities.
It is to be noted that the process MBA has been divided into an accessible and
an inaccessible part. The centrifuge cascade,maintenance and testing areas
for centrifuges are located vithin the latter area.
4. Basic structure of a probable recording system
In the present paper a computerized record system has been considered. For
smaller size plants, a much simpler record system m~ be economically more
advantageous. Some thoughts to a possible structure of arecord system are
summarized here.
4. 1 Storage MBA
This MBA is expected to have feed, product and tail cylinders end waste con-
tainers. Each of the cylinders or containers represent a batch for the
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recording system. At the key measurement point A,every feed cylinder entering




Weight of total uranium
Weight of U-235
Weight percentage of U-235
These entries are the batch data for each cylinder and are taken over from
the shippers data.
Similar information is registered for outgoing cylinders or cOntainers for
products, tails and waste amounts at the KMPs Dl-D4. These batch data corres-
pond to the data generated at the KMPs cl-c4.
4.2 Process MBA (accessible part)
At the KMP-D ,UF6 from a cylinder are to be measured and after purification
fed intothe cascade. The measurement consists of a) Brutto anet Tar~weighing
of the c~linder, b) if necessary, taking of a UF6 sample for the analysis of
impurities and isotopic composition. The differences in the measurement values
between the key measurement points B and A are shipper-receiver differences
(SR/D) and m~ be caused by difference in measurement errors (or other types of
errors if any) and cylinder heels, caused by incomplete evaporation or solid
residues of uranium compounds. The batch data are the same as at KMP A with
additional information on impurities. Also the identity of samples taken are
to be recorded. At this point the source data for a given batch are also to
be registered to the extent they are generated. They m~ consist of information
on weighing, chemical and isotopic analysis and the corresponding data on
measurement calibration and standards.
Different types of waste amounts (HF/UF6 wastes from purification stations,
decontamination wastes from effluent treatment etc.) are supposed to be measured
at the KMP Cl and C2. These wastes m~ correspond to approximately 0.5 %of
the feed stream with mainly natural uranium concentration. They~ be collected
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in suitable containers and each of the containers sampled for very rough
estimation of uranium and occasionally of U-235 content. The batch data
are similar to those obtained at KMP-B.
Tail streams from the cascade containing depleted U-235 are supposed to be
registered at the KMP-C3. More than 80 %of the feed appears as the tail
stream (Table 1) in the reference plant considered here. Therefore, empty
feed cylinders will probably be used for storine the tails.
For material accountancy purposes knowledge on the amount and isotopic composi-
tion is required for each of the cylinders containing tails if such cylinders
are considered as a bateh. However, since the tails represent a very low
economic value, they m~ not be measured by the plant operators as rigorously
as the product streams. The tails m~ be expected to be stored at the facility
for a long time. Some containment measures for the the tail cylinders will
be required to av6id recyciing. Batch data tor the tails are the cylirider
number, total uranium amount and the weight percentage of U-235. The chemical
composition m~ be taken to be the ratio U!UF6 • 0.68 since all gaseous impurities
are expected to be concentrated at the product end.
The product streamsare measured and registered at the KMP-c4. Since the product
&mount i8 approximatelY 1!6th of the feed amount, smaller size of product
cylinders (Le. 2 t) mq be expected to be used. Accurate measurements
(weighing, chemical and isotopic analysis) are to be made for each batch.
SampIes m~ be taken from the product lines instead of from the product cylinders
to avoid reheating and homogenization of the product in the latter. However,
representativeness of the sampIes for a batch has to be ensured.
The batch data are similar to those at the KMP-B.
4.3 Inventory taking
The inventory" taking for the storage MBA is simple and can be carried out
by making tag verification of cylinder data. In the accessible part of the
process MBA in which all the intermediate storage vessels traps etc. are
located, two types of inventory taking have been envisaged. One is of the
accurate type (probably once in a year) during which the sublimators and apart of
the traps are emptied and the content measured with the same accuracies as are
available at the corresponding key measurement points 15/. In the other
ce.se, rough estimates of the contents of the sublimators are made on the
basis of plant operational data. For this purpose i t is assumed that rough
flow measurement points before the sublimators will be available around the
KMPs B, C3 and c4 (Fig. 4). The nuclear material inventory of the vacuum
traps in the accessible parts of the process MBA, the gas phase inventory
in the cascade as well e.s the solid phase inventory in the cascade and in
other parts of the plant in the inaccessible process MBA are expected to be
estimated on the basis of historical data and experience.
4.4 EDP-slstem
The electronic data processing system can be built up in such a w~ that it
can be used for both record and report system for safeguards and for financial
calculations for the production in aplant. The block diagram. for sucha
computer based system is shown in Fig. 5. The measured values re~evant to
safeguards generated at a KMP are registered on punch cards for further
processing. Typical punch cards for the source data on material identification
and weighing are shown in Fig. 6. The EDP produces an accounting record in the
form of a listing per batch and KMP, whenever a movement of one batch from
one MBA to the other takes place. Such a listing is shown in Fig. 7. Besides,
these data are stored in an intermediate storage (a.g. magnet tape) for
establishing a material balance at the time of a physical inventory taking.
The batch data for all the movements of cylinders trom and to B MBA are printed
out every month and can be sent as an inventory change report to the relevant
safeguards organisation. At the time of s physical inventory taking, &11 the
inventory batches for the two MBAs will be registered and the EDP establishes
a material balance on the basis of historical data on measureaent errors, the
stored data on inventory change since the last inventory and the starting
and the physical inventory data. A summarized print out of all the physical
inventory oatches (PIt) and the material balancing ~ form the basis for
the respective PIL and material balance reports.
Besides the accounting record, the operating record is to contain information
ameng others, on calibration of measuring instruments, measurement errors,
inventory taking procedures, procedures for analysis of lasses etc. 13/.
They are not elaborated here.
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5. Concluding Remarks
At present no commercial centrifuge plants are in operation. Information
on the extent and magnitude of a number of problems relevant to safeguards
are still required. The loss rate of UF6 from a cascade, the hidden inven-
tories, the accuracy of measurement for waste materials etc., belong to
such problem areas. However, systems analytical results and experimental
experience indicate that these problems though have to be solved, do not
pose any significant hazard to international safeguards. The inherent
characteristics of a centrifuge plant associated with proper layout conditions
would present a good basis for the effective executi6n of material accounting
measures.
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Table 1
Data on the Reference Centrifuge Plant
Items
Separative work
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U-235 Conc. in waste streams
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Fig. 1: Measured separation work in an ex:perimental cascade as
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Fig.7 Inventory change in an accounting record
